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IN HIV MISDIAGNOSIS CASES
CAITLIN A. SCHMID
INTRODUCTION
Tom Davis' physician informed him that his HIV test had
come out positive, indicating he had the virus that causes Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). "I was bawling my
eyes out," Davis said. "He . . . gave me a death sentence and
walked out."' After one month, Davis learned that the test had in
fact been a "false positive": he did not actually have the disease.
Davis brought a suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress
against his physician and the hospital, asking for a written apology
and symbolic compensation of $400. David Thompson, Davis'
lawyer, said: "An HIV test means so much more than just sticking
a needle in someone's arm. With a positive result you may not be
able to get insurance, establish a mortgage or buy a car.",2
In a more severe case, a man lived with the certainty that he
had the HIV virus for nearly six years before learning that he had
been misdiagnosed.3 During those years, Lon Blatteau had under-
gone treatment for AIDS, even taking Azidothymidine-the drug
more commonly known as AZT. When he learned of the misdiag-
nosis, Blatteau filed suit against his physician for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. According to attorney David Curtin,
someone in Blatteau's position is "in no man's land. He is HIV-
negative but for years he has taken drugs designed for people that
are HIV-positive."4 Blatteau said that the misdiagnosis "ruined
[his] life."5
AIDS is well known to be fatal, and the reaction of those
misdiagnosed with HIV is understandably one of anger and dis-
1. Jennifer Ditchbum, Man Sues Doctor Who Allegedly Misdiagnosed AIDS Virus:
Negative Result Was Revealed Month After First Diagnosis, OTrAWA CITIzEN, July 23,
1995, at A5.
2. Id.
3. See Michael Kelly, HIV Positive Result Wrong, OMAHA WoRLD-HERALD, June
24, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4078397.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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tress. Between 1981 and 1991, it is estimated, 100,000 people in
the United States died of AIDS.6 The fear surrounding AIDS is
heightened by several characteristics of the disease. First, an in-
fected individual may display no physical symptoms but still be
infectious to others.7 Second, there is no immunization effective
against AIDS and no known cure. Third, the disease manifests
itself in a number of frightening ways, from fungus to dementia,
and is invariably fatal.'
The medical technology used to combat AIDS is new, uncer-
tain, and imperfect. The test most often used to screen for HIV,
the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay test (ELISA),9 typically
produces a small number of false positives, though misdiagnoses
are rare.'0 Cases like those brought by Davis and Blatteau are
usually prompted by the imperfections in the medical technology
itself rather than any alleged negligence of the treating physi-
cian." These lawsuits against physicians discourage not the negli-
6. See Center for Disease Control, Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-
United States, 1981-90, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 41, 43 (1991).
7. See Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in
AIDS LAW TODAY 18, 22 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
8. See Mervyn F. Silverman, AIDS Medical Education for Lawyers, Judges, and
Legislators, in AIDS AND THE COURTS 27, 31 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds.,
1990).
9. See Hill v. Evans, No. CIV.A.91-A-626-T, 1993 WL 595676, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Oct. 7, 1993). The ELISA is used as the first screen for HIV. Id. The ELISA test is
relatively cheap (costs at private laboratories range from $15 to $65) and reliable (the
number of false positives has been estimated to be .15%). See Josephine A. Mauskopf et
al., Economic Impact of Treatment of HIV-positive Pregnant Women and Their Newborns
with Zidovudina. Implications for HIV Screenings, JAMA, July 10, 1996, at 132, 135.
Other sources differ as to reliability of the ELISA. See, eg., PAUL G. FANNHAM ET AL,
U.S. DEPr. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC HEALTH REPS., COUNSELING AND TEST-
ING FOR HIV PREVENTON: COSTS, EFFECTS, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF MORE RAPID
SCREENING TESTS 13 (1996), available in 1996 WL 9871637; Hill, 1993 WL 595676, at *2
("[I]f everyone were to be tested for the HIV virus, then possibly nine out of every ten
positive results could be false. If tests are run in 'high risk' groups, however, then the
reliability of the results is over 90%."). In either case, the test, "designed to be as sen-
sitive as possible in order to decrease the likelihood of false negative readings[,] . . . is
susceptible to false positive readings." Hall v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
387, 389 (1996). The Center for Disease Control has strongly recommended that a second
test, usually the "Western Blot" test, be performed should the ELISA reveal HIV anti-
bodies. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1499 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
10. See, eg., Hall, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389.
11. This is not to say that some of these cases may not involve negligence on the
part of the physician. This negligence would involve the manner in which the physician
relayed the results of the test to the patient, or the physician's failure to inform the
patient of the slight imperfection of the ELISA test and the necessity of undergoing a
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gence of physicians, but rather, the willingness of physicians to
administer the ELISA test." Thus, the distress of the individuals
misdiagnosed with HIV must be weighed against the importance
of encouraging physicians to use these nascent tests.1
The few courts that have addressed emotional distress damag-
es in HIV misdiagnosis cases unfortunately follow one of two
paths. This Note will focus on three cases which have reached the
higher courts: Heiner v. Moretuzzo,'4 R.J. v. Humana of Flori-
da,5 and Chizmar v. Mackie.6 In Heiner and R.J., the courts
denied the plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that the false positive
diagnosis produced no physical injury.' In Chizmar the court
recognized the plaintiff's right to emotional distress damages, bas-
ing the damages on the duty established by the physician-patient
relationship."
This Note argues that neither of these approaches adequately
addresses the issues involved. Given the genuine and foreseeable
suffering these patients must experience, the physical injury re-
quirement is outdated, and is potentially both under- and over-
inclusive in allowing damages: under-inclusive in that it may deny
second, more precise test. This Note argues that the importance of remedying these in-
stances of negligence on the part of the physician does not outweigh the importance of
releasing the results of the AIDS test, and that unless the negligence constitutes gross
negligence, or the reporting is done in bad faith, the physician should be protected
against liability. See, e.g., Frederick R. Fahrner, Comment, The Physician's Duty to Warn
Non-Patients: AIDS Enters the Equation, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 353, 359 (1988) (stating that
a physician should not be held liable to a patient "even where the physician's diagnosis
is erroneous, unless the physician acted negligently in making his diagnosis").
12. An alternative to the physician-administered ELISA is the mail-in HIV test. This
test was recently approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration. See Tom Carney,
Despite Concerns, Home HIV Tests Are Here to Stay, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 9, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 6253527. However, there is a concern that such tests will increase
the number of false positive results. See id at *7.
In addition, a new, "rapid HIV screening test" has been approved by some hospi-
tals. See Paul G. Farnham et al., Counseling and Testing for HIV Prevention: Costs, Ef-
fects, and Cost-Effectiveness of More Rapid Screening Tests, PUB. HEALTH REP., Jan. 11,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9871637. Rapid HIV screening tests are "designed to be used
as a single assay and take 10 minutes or less on average." Id.
13. Laboratories may also be liable for false positives due to their involvement in
the testing process, but the nature of that liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
14. 652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995).
15. 625 So. 2d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), affd in relevant part, 652 So. 2d 360
(Fla. 1995).
16. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
17. See Heiner, 652 N.E.2d at 670; RJ., 625 So. 2d at 117.
18. See Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 214.
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recovery in the case of genuine mental suffering, over-inclusive in
that it may allow a court to award damages for insignificant physi-
cal harm rather than for the emotional harm that is the real inju-
ry. However, due to the public policy need to protect physicians
from liability in some of these cases,19 the physical injury require-
ment should be replaced rather than rejected. A balance must be
struck between recognizing genuine emotional distress and protect-
ing physicians from unlimited liabilities. Courts should apply a
good faith immunity standard, which would recognize the difficulty
of administering to patients with certain illnesses and would pro-
tect physicians from liability where the physician acts in good
faith.
Part I of this Note discusses the restrictiveness of the physical
injury requirement. It reviews the history of emotional distress
damages and the current use of the physical injury requirement,
including its use by the courts in two of the three HIV misdiag-
noses cases. It then discusses the "fear of future disease" cases as
a model for breaking free of the physical injury requirement. Part
II argues that the physical injury requirement is outdated, but that
the current alternative-using the physician-patient relationship as
a basis for recovery-carries with it at least two dangers. First, by
allowing patients to sue their physicians for emotional distress,
courts are also exposing physicians to expansive third-party claims.
This danger is illustrated in "recovered memory" therapy cases,
where courts have held doctors liable to individuals outside of the
physician-patient relationship. Second, allowing recovery when
HIV is misdiagnosed confuses cutting-edge medical technology's
uncertainties with physician negligence. This type of confusion is
also apparent in cases involving Pap smears, in which physicians
have repeatedly been held liable for imperfect technology.
Part III analyzes the final HIV misdiagnosis case, arguing that
courts must consider the effects of physician liability on the use of
imperfect but necessary testing and thereby acknowledge a soci-
etal, not individual, view of emotional well-being in the face of
epidemic. Part IV concludes that courts should approach HIV
misdiagnosis cases by granting good faith immunity to physicians
through the "professional judgment rule."
19. See discussion infra Sections II.A-B.
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I. THE PHYSICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT
A. Standards of Recovery for Emotional Distress
Traditionally, damages for emotional distress have been predi-
cated upon the existence of some coincident physical injury.'
Courts have objected to permitting recovery in the absence of a
tangible injury for various reasons. First, mental disturbance is
difficult to measure in terms of money and thus arguably should
not be the basis for a cause of action.2 Second, it is difficult to
establish that mental disturbance is proximately caused by a
defendant's action.' Third, courts fear that a vast increase in liti-
gation would ensue based on claims of less than serious emotional
distress if recovery were generally allowed.' Courts responded to
these concerns by creating various physical injury tests for ensur-
ing the validity of the alleged harm. At different times, courts
have embraced the contemporaneous physical injury test or the
"impact requirement;"'24 the "zone of danger" test;' and the
"resultant physical harm" test'2
20. See, eg., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896); Spade v.
Lynn & B.R. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897).
21. Se4 eg., Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354 (stating that if the defendant were negligent
"we think the ... cases, as well as public policy, fully justify us in holding that the
plaintiff cannot recover").
22. See, eg., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982) (explaining
that the injury requirement determines boundaries of proximate cause and provides proof
of genuineness of claim).
23. See Spade, 47 N.E. at 89 (explaining that the rule prohibiting recovery for mental
distress which is unaccompanied by physical harm is justified because allowing recovery
for such claims "would open a wide door for unjust claims"); see also Knaub v. Gotwalt,
220 A.2d 646, 647 (Pa. 1966) (noting that if the courts allowed recovery for emotional
distress in the absence of physical injury or impact the "[c]ourts would be swamped by a
virtual avalanche of cases for damages for many situations and cases hitherto unrecover-
able").
24. Under the "impact requirement," a plaintiff may not recover for emotional dis-
tress unless he has been actually physically affected by the action which caused the dis-
tress. See, eg., Comfax Corp. v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 118, 127
n.11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that accompanying physical impact must occur prior to
or simultaneously with the infliction of emotional distress); see also Knaub, 220 A.2d at
647 (stating that "there can be no recovery of damages for injuries resulting from fright
or nervous shock or mental or emotional disturbances or distress, unless they are accom-
panied by physical injury or physical impact").
25. The "zone of danger" test requires that the plaintiff was near enough to the
activity causing the emotional distress to have been in personal danger of physical injury.
See, e.g., Guilmette v. Alexander, 259 A.2d 12, 14 (Vt. 1969) (denying recovery to plain-
tiff mother who witnessed the severe injury of her child but was not herself within the
zone of physical danger).
26. The "resultant physical harm" test requires that a plaintiff's emotional distress
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However, the arguments in favor of requiring a physical injury
have, appropriately, been increasingly criticized by modern
courts.27 Courts, astutely recognizing that emotional distress may
be just as painful as a physical injury, if not more so, have begun
to hold that "[a] person's psychic well-being is as much entitled to
legal protection as is his physical well-being."'  The physical inju-
ry requirement for "fear of disease" cases 29 has been criticized as
an "adherence to procrustean principles which have little or no re-
semblance to medical realities."3 This statement makes sense in
light of the specificity and reliability of current psychiatric eval-
uations. It is more desirable to allow a court to judge whether
emotional harm warrants recovery on a flexible, case-by-case basis,
with the help of expert testimony, than to rely on the arbitrary
existence of an accompanying physical injury.31
The removal of the physical injury requirement" permits a
negligence cause of action for the infliction of serious emotional
distress.33 New York, for example, recognizes a general duty to
avoid negligent infliction of emotional distress.34 Hawaii has also
manifest itself in some physical injury. See, eg., St. Charles v. Kender, 646 N.E,2d 411,
414 (Mass. App. Ct.) (denying recovery because plaintiff failed to introduce expert evi-
dence demonstrating that her physical injury was caused by her emotional distress), re-
view denied, 648 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. 1995).
27. See Mary Donovan, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claim for Fear of
Future Consequences? 41 UCLA L. REv. 1337, 1354 (1994) (noting that "[s]everal courts
and legal scholars have condemned the physical injury requirement as 'an artificial device'
that is both 'overinclusive' and 'underinclusive' as a screening mechanism").
28. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283 (Me. 1987); see
also infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
29. Fear of potential disease cases differ significantly from the misdiagnosis cases.
The fear of disease cases arise from situations in which the plaintiff has been negligently
exposed to cancer or AIDS and brings a suit for the emotional distress resulting from
such exposure. See generally Donovan, supra note 27, at 1369-70.
30. Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Require-
ment in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1, 35 (1992) (quoting Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 379
(Ala. 1981)).
31. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 27, at 1379.
32. See Marrs, supra note 30, at 4, 39; see, eg., Gammon, 534 A.2d at 1285 (noting
that the analyses of commentators and the developing trend in case law encourages aban-
donment of "artificial devices" and turns instead to reliance "upon the trial process for
protection against fraudulent claims").
33. See, eg., Abourezk v. N.Y. Airlines, Inc., 895 F.2d 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (cita-
tions omitted) (requiring emotional disturbance of "so acute a nature that harmful physi-
cal consequences might not be unlikely to result"); Gammon, 534 A.2d at 1284 (allowing
claim of severe emotional distress without a showing of physical impact).
34. See, e.g., Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 448 N.E. 2d 1332, 1335 (N.Y. 1983) (requir-
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held that "freedom from... mental distress is entitled to inde-
pendent legal protection," if that distress is severe, genuine, and
foreseeable. 5 California has extended the scope of recovery for
emotional distress even further, allowing jurors to assess the emo-
tional injury as presented by expert witnesses, stressing that where
the emotional harm would commonly be accepted as being severe,
recovery should be permitted 6 The states following this trend
place greater reliance on the tort law principles of duty and proxi-
mate cause to determine emotional distress damages, 7 asking
whether the mental distress is genuine, serious and reasonably
foreseeable.38
B. Physical Injury Requirement and HIV Misdiagnoses: Heiner v.
Moretuzzo and R.J. v. Humana of Florida
Of the HIV misdiagnosis cases that have been tried, several
have been dismissed for lack of a concomitant physical injury. In
Heiner v. Moretuzzo the plaintiff brought actions for negligent
misdiagnosis of HEV against her physician, the hospital, and the
laboratory that performed the HIV testing. The court simply held:
"Ohio does not recognize a claim for negligent infliction of serious
emotional distress where the distress is caused by the plaintiff's
fear of a nonexistent physical peril."'39 While the court noted that
exceptions to the "actual peril" requirement did exist,' they re-
fused to apply them to the case at bar or to create a new excep-
tion. The court stated that it was not willing "to create a
'subspecies' of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
that applies only in the context of the patient-physician relation-
ship."
41
ing that defendant owes a special duty to plaintiff before plaintiff may recover).
35. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
36. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (recognizing
"the universally accepted gravity of a false imputation of syphilis").
37. See Donovan, supra note 27, at 1375.
38. A majority of states still follow the traditional physical injury rule; as of 1992,
however, an "emerging (minority) trend" can be seen among the 14 states that have re-
jected the physical injury requirement. Marrs, supra note 30, at 4.
39. Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664, 665 (Ohio 1995).
40. Id. at 670 n.3 (citing, for example, Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'm, 514
N.E.2d 430, 432-33 (Ohio CL App. 1986) (permitting recovery where defendants were
responsible for desecration of a grave)).
41. Id. at 670.
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In reaching this holding, the Heiner court relied on Criswell v.
Brentwood Hospital,42 in which the plaintiff's daughter was misdi-
agnosed as having been sexually abused. The Criswell court rea-
soned that "apprehension of a non-existent physical peril" does
not warrant recovery.43 The court ultimately held that the physi-
cian who reported the abuse was immune from liability under
state law." The plaintiffs claimed that immunity should not apply
to emotional distress arising from the misdiagnosis. However,
instead of simply extending immunity,45 the court discussed at
length the plaintiff's failure to fulfill the physical impact re-
quirement. In doing so, the court departed from the traditional
approach in such cases, which is to protect the physician from
liability without considering the issue of physical injury to the
plaintiff.' Like the HIV misdiagnosis cases, the physician in the
Criswell case ordered tests to be administered, and did not per-
form the tests himself.47 The physician simply reported what he
believed to be the results of those tests. If he is privileged in
reporting those results (whether correct or not) to the welfare au-
thorities, it logically follows that he should be privileged in relay-
ing that information to the family itself. In not taking this logical
step to expand immunity, the Criswell court set an unnecessarily
strong precedent for applying the physical impact rule in physi-
cian-patient cases of emotional distress.
The Heiner court's closing statement seems a bit more ambig-
uous than the Criswell holding: "[w]hile we remain vigilant in our
efforts to ensure an individual's 'right to emotional tranquility,' we
decline to expand the law to permit recovery on the facts of this
case."48 This statement suggests either that the court was making
the "individual's right to emotional tranquility"49 impossibly nar-
row,50 or that it meant to limit its own holding, protecting a phy-
42. 551 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
43. Id. at 1318.
44. See id. at 1317.
45. The Criswell court based its finding of immunity on Ohio Revenue Code section
2151.421. See id.
46. See, eg., Michaels v. Gordon, 439 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding psy-
chologist immune from liability as long as his actions evince no bad faith).
47. See Criswell, 551 N.E.2d at 1316.
48. Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ohio 1995) (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. See generally Donovan, supra note 27, at 1354-55 (noting that several courts and
legal scholars have condemned the physical injury requirement as an under-inclusive
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sician who seems to have exercised reasonable care. Indeed, the
outcome, summary judgment in favor of the defendants, does
seem justified given the facts of the case. For example, the defen-
dant physician had the blood tested twice, and immediately re-
ferred the plaintiff to a blood specialist."' Nonetheless, the ap-
proach the court uses-requiring actual physical harm-is "out-
dated and ridiculous., 5
2
In dissent, Judge Alice Robbie Resnick embraced a more
appropriate approach. She noted that "some standards are neces-
sary to govern recovery in a case such as this," but that "a blan-
ket prohibition of recovery in false-positive cases is [not] appropri-
ate."'53 She went on to argue that the "traditional tort law con-
cepts of duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages can
serve to effectively limit recovery to those plaintiffs who deserve
it, as in any other negligence case."'54 She emphasized that the
requirement that the emotional harm be "serious" and that the
damage be "foreseeable" provides a sufficient limit on the
defendant's liability.5 Judge Resnick's dissent reproached the ma-
jority for its use of the physical injury requirement. However, her
belief in the effectiveness of the tort system as an effective limita-
tion on recovery does not take into account the acute need for
protection of the physician in cases involving new technology.56
Perhaps the Heiner court, like other state courts, felt con-
strained by precedent. For example, in R.J. v. Humana of Florida,
Inc., the state District Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, in
rejecting a negligence claim based on an HIV misdiagnosis, stated:
"Although we believe that the [physical injury] rule should not
apply to a case of a negligent HIV diagnosis, we acknowledge that
this case does not squarely fall within the recognized exceptions to
the impact rule and thus we are constrained to affirm the dismiss-
al of the appellants' complaint."57 The Supreme Court of Florida
screening device).
51. See Heiner, 652 N.E.2d at 665.
52. Amy L. Hansen, Establishing Uniformity in HIV-Fear Cases, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.
1251, 1269 (1995).
53. Heiner, 652 N.E.2d at 670-71 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 671.
55. Id.
56. This need is evidenced by the reaction to the Pap smear cases. See infra notes
128-37 and accompanying text.
57. R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 625 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(footnote omitted), aff'd in relevant part, 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995); see also Doe v.
1996] 439
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
rejected the chance to make an exception to the impact rule for a
negligent HIV diagnosis: "were we to create such an exception,"
the court rationalized, "we would, of necessity, also be allowing a
claim for emotional distress for any misdiagnosis made from negli-
gent medical testing .... It would be exceedingly difficult to limit
speculative claims for damages in litigation under such an excep-
tion.,"
The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the outcome of an
HIV misdiagnosis suit might be different were the plaintiff able to
demonstrate "invasive medical treatment or prescriptions of caustic
medication such as AZT, and that he suffered bodily injury from
that treatment" 59-that is, if the plaintiff showed a physical inju-
ry.
C. Fear-of Disease Cases: Models for Breaking Free of the Physi-
cal Injury Requirement
Courts who do reject the physical injury requirement continue
to worry that emotional harm is often temporary and trivial, and
may be easily falsified or imagined. There is concern that recovery
is unfair because it imposes a disproportionately heavy financial
burden upon the defendant, whose conduct was only negligent. 0
Most of the courts recognizing a duty to refrain from negligent
infliction of emotional distress also realize the need for weighing
this duty against the interest in reasonably limiting the defendant's
liability. Courts have limited recovery by raising the level of proof
for proximate cause and injury,6' by using an objective standard
regarding the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the
defendant's negligence,62 or by limiting recovery to instances
Southeastern Univ., 732 F. Supp. 7 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a student alleging wrongful
disclosure by defendant university that he had AIDS could not recover absent a physical
injury).
58. R.J., 652 So. 2d at 364.
59. Id. For a case following this rule, see Jones v. Department of Health & Reha-
bilitative Servs., 661 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
60. See, eg., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Mass. 1982) ("[W]here the
defendant's conduct has been merely negligent, without any element of intent to harm,
his fault is not so great that he should be required to make good a purely mental distur-
bance.") (citation omitted).
61. See Donovan, supra note 27, at 1370.
62. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919-21 (Cal. 1968) (holding that reasonable
foreseeability defines the limits of the defendant's liability as well as the scope of the
plaintiff's recovery).
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where a pre-existing duty exists.6' Concerns associated with allow-
ing recovery for emotional distress are alleviated where fright and
shock are "marked by definite physical symptoms," capable of
medical or other objective proof, or where there is "some guaran-
tee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case."'
There is no general agreement among the courts as to what
constitutes a "guarantee of' genuineness. ' 6 The issue underlying
this controversy is whether fairness will permit leaving the burden
of loss upon an innocent plaintiff or, on the other hand, whether
it is right to protect the plaintiff against mere negligence, when
the elements of extreme outrage and moral blame are lacking.66
Courts disagree as to the proper balancing of these concerns. In at
least two situations courts have allowed damages for negligence in
the absence of physical impact: the negligent mishandling of a
corpse,' and the negligent transmission of a message, especially
one announcing death.' These two situations have in common
"an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress,
arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee
that the claim is not spurious. 69 Other situations, if any, that
might constitute a similar guarantee have not been conclusively
identified. However, if a message falsely reporting the death of a
family member is considered a guarantee that a plaintiff's suffering
is genuine, then surely a message falsely predicting one's own
death (such as misdiagnosis of HIV) is just as powerful a guaran-
tee.
The need for a consistent approach to cases of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress has become increasingly important in
cases, like those concerning HIV misdiagnoses, involving disputed
63. See Donovan, supra note 27, at 1364-65.
64. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEEON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54,
at 361 (5th ed. 1984).
65. Id. (noting that one interest which is still a subject of substantial controversy is
that of freedom from mental disturbance).
66. See id. at 361; see, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Iowa 1981)
(Allbee, J., dissenting) ("I am not a party to the opening of this 'Pandora's Box."').
67. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283, 1286
(Me. 1987) (allowing recovery for emotional distress against a hospital where plaintiff
found a human leg in a bag purportedly containing his recently deceased father's person-
al belongings).
68. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592-93 (N.Y. 1975) (holding hospital
liable for negligently informing the plaintiff that her mother had died, and noting that
plaintiff suffered from "residual physical manifestations" of her emotional distress).
69. KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, at 362.
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medical technology. It has been noted that "[t]echnological disas-
ters ... being of human manufacture, are at least in principle
preventable, so there is always a story to tell about them, always a
moral to draw, always a share of blame to assign. They provoke
outrage rather than acceptance or resignation." 70 This statement
applies well to situations involving medical uncertainty. Patients
subject to the inherent imperfections of new medical technology
are understandably interested in finding a specific person to blame
for their misdiagnoses. Courts must consider the imbalance be-
tween the individual's need to recover and the public interest in
insulating critical new medical technology from liability.
One area in which courts have had to decide whether to
allow emotional distress damages is the "fear of disease" cases.
"Cancerphobia" and "AIDSphobia" cases usually involve a
plaintiff who has allegedly been exposed to either disease and as a
result suffers from a fear of having an increased risk of contract-
ing that disease. Because of the deadly nature of cancer and
AIDS, as well as the lack of education about the ways in which
these diseases are contracted, "fear of disease" cases have been
highly litigated. Courts and commentators dealing with these cases
have not taken a consistent approach in determining which claims
are meritorious and should be litigated.7' In the absence of clear
medical proof of physical injury, courts generally hold that the
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating some guarantee of genu-
ineness of the alleged emotional harm, usually by the introduction
of expert testimony, 2 to ensure the legitimacy of the claim.'
In most "fear of disease" cases, courts, refusing to break free
of the physical injury requirement, make the claim for emotional
distress depend on the actual likelihood of the plaintiff developing
the disease. 4 Others have dismissed the physical injury require-
70. Donovan, supra note 27, at 1340 (quoting Kai Erikson, Toxic Reckoning: Business
Faces a New Kind of Fear, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 118, 125).
71. See Karen L. Chadwick, Fear of AIDS: The Catalyst for Expanding Judicial Rec-
ognition of a Duty to Prevent Emotional Distress Beyond Traditional Bounds, 25 N.M. L.
REv. 143, 160-70 (1995).
72. See Donovan, supra note 27, at 1394.
73. See Edward B. Lumpkin, Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in AIDS-Pho-
bia Cases: A Suggested Approach for Virginia, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717, 742 (1994)
(citing Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 75-76 (D. Mass.
1993) (allowing recovery for emotional distress in AIDSphobia case under Jones Act be-
cause it was "beyond doubt that plaintiff suffered genuine emotional distress")).
74. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1986).
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ment as unnecessary for proving the genuineness of the distress,
and allow recovery even where there is only a "theoretical possi-
bility" that the plaintiff's risk of fatal illness has increased.75 One
court justified its refusal to rely on the physical injury requirement
by stating that the fear of cancer or AIDS "'must necessarily have
a most depressing effect ... [because like] the sword of Damo-
cles, [the plaintiff] knows not when it will fall."'76
The "fear of disease" cases set an important precedent for
HIV misdiagnosis cases, because at least a few of them properly
reject the physical injury requirement, basing this decision on the
generally accepted seriousness of cancer and AIDS.77 Thus, if
courts are willing to allow recovery for the fear of future manifes-
tation of a disease, they should certainly not balk at allowing
recovery for the much more tangible emotional distress in misdiag-
nosis cases. The emotional distress is more tangible in two signifi-
cant ways. First, the "fear of disease" cases involve speculation
about the reasonableness of the patient's fear, given that the dis-
ease itself is an unguaranteed future event. In contrast, in the case
of a misdiagnosis, the fear has been completely realized when a
person is told he is HIV-positive. Second, it is often difficult to re-
strict the "fear of disease" cases to a specific time period,78
whereas a misdiagnosis and subsequent negative test are easily iso-
lated in time.
In rejecting the physical injury test, some courts express the
legitimate concern that "fear of disease" cases discourage physi-
cians from warning patients about possible complications (such as
exposure to cancer or AIDS) involved in surgery or treatment.79
75. See Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 989 F.2d 278, 279-80 (8th Cir. 1993)
(allowing damages for fear of future cancer even though medical testimony established
that there was only a "theoretical possibility" that the delay in the patient's treatment
could cause her cancer to become invasive in the future).
76. Glen Donath, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. Cl1.
L. REv. 1113, 1114-15 (1995) (quoting Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E.
885, 886 (N.C. 1912)).
77. See, e.g., Marriott, 827 F. Supp. at 75-76 (allowing recovery for emotional distress
in AIDS-phobia case because it was beyond a doubt that the plaintiff suffered genuine
emotional distress).
78. Courts usually attempt to limit recovery to a "reasonable window of anxiety,"
typically the time from which the plaintiff is exposed to the disease to the time at which
the plaintiff learns that she does not have the disease. See, eg., Faya v. Almaraz, 620
A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993). Often, however, exposure is not instantaneous but gradual, as
when an employee is exposed to asbestos in the workplace. See, eg., In re Hawaii Feder-
al Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990).
79. See, eg., Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. 219 N.W.2d 576, 577 (Wis. 1974)
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Unfortunately, despite their concern for the physicians, a number
of these courts hold that the "pre-existing relationship" established
by the physician-patient interaction establishes a duty on the part
of the physician to avoid any infliction of emotional distress."
Thus, while the "fear of disease" cases rightly reject the physical
injury test, they embrace a test that is at least as problematic.
II. THE DANGERS OF EXPANDING PHYSICIAN LIABILITY
A. The Physician-Patient Relationship as a Basis for Emotional
Distress Liability
Since the 1980s, courts have increasingly used the physician-
patient relationship as a basis for a cause of action for emotional
distress.8 One commentator has argued:
It does not strain one's credulity to recognize that the doctor-
patient relationship imposes an obligation on the part of the
doctor to use care both in the treatment and diagnosis of a pa-
tient. Neither is it an illogical extension of existing law to say
that duties arising out of a fiduciary relationship include the duty
to prevent emotional harm in the course of performing the obli-
gations imposed by the [doctor-patient] relationship.'
Basing the recovery for emotional distress on the physician-patient
relationship sets a dangerous precedent in the HIV misdiagnosis
cases because it detracts attention from two important consider-
ations. First, it blurs the distinction between physician negligence
and the inherent faultiness of the medical technology involved.
Second, it focuses attention on the physician's duty to his patient
and ignores his duty to the public health.'
(stating that "to allow recovery would be contrary to public policy" and put "too unrea-
sonable a burden upon doctors and physicians").
80. See infra notes 81-88.
81. See generally Chadwick, supra note 71, at 149 ("In the 1980s, there was a gradu-
al expansion of recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress where the victim was
able to prove a preexisting relationship with the tortfeasor at the time of the emotional
injury.").
82. Id. at 159.
83. For a discussion of a physician's duty to protect public health, see Marc A.
Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in
a Changing Health Care System 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 250-51 (1995) (noting that in
addition to the physician's duty to her patient, she has a "role in promoting public
health"); see also infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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Physicians have also faced increased liability because the ten-
dency of courts to be deferential to a physician's judgment seems
to be declining.' The combination of increased emphasis on the
physician-patient relationship and decreased deference to medical
judgment not only leaves physicians fully exposed to the arbitrari-
ness of the tort system, but bases their liability upon their very
role as a physician. This may make sense in a typical case of phy-
sician negligence; it is undesirable to cloak negligent behavior in
deference. Where the "negligence" is the result of imperfect medi-
cal technology, however, it is equally undesirable that a physician
be held responsible for mistakes that he did not make.
B. Liability to Third Parties
A second danger in doing away with the check provided by
the physical injury requirement is that the physician-patient rela-
tionship may lead to physicians' broad liability to third parties.
Because courts have recognized that the physician is the first line
of defense against the spread of communicable diseases,85 they
hold that the duty of a physician extends to those "within the
foreseeable orbit of risk of harm" presented by the patient.86
Whenever a physician is placed in a position where the absence of
ordinary care and skill would cause danger of injury to a third
84. See, e.g., DAVID HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE, §§ 16.3, 21.6 (1994). There
has been a recent decline in the use of the California Book of Approved Jury Instruc-
tions, section 6.02, entitled "Medical Perfection Not Required," which states: "A physician
is not necessarily negligent because [she] errs in judgement or because [her] efforts prove
unsuccessful. The physician is negligent if the error in judgement or lack of success is
due to a failure to perform any of the duties as defined by these instructions." See THE
COMMiriEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS (BARl), (8th ed. 1995); see also Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 831 (Del.
1992) (noting an even split between states upholding the instruction and those deciding it
is prejudicial to the plaintiff).
85. See, e.g., Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456, 458 (Ohio 1928) (holding that a physi-
cian caring for a patient with a contagious or infectious disease has a duty to exercise
care in advising and warning members of the family and to avoid doing any act which
would tend to spread the infection, and to take all necessary precautionary measures to
prevent its spread to other patients); 41 AM. JUR1 2d Physicians & Surgeons, § 246
(1995) (stating that one "who by reason of his professional relations is placed in a posi-
tion where it becomes his duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from injury or
danger is liable in damages to those injured by reason of his failure to do so").
86. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1990)
(quoting Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 199 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 1964)).
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party, a duty arises to use ordinary care to avoid that dangerY
These courts reason that the special relationship between a patient
and his doctor or psychotherapist gives rise to affirmative duties to
third parties.8 The doctor must balance the duty to her patient
against her duty to protect public health; that is, she must weigh
the utility of the doctor's publicizing a patient's condition against
the harm to an individual patient caused by the doctor's publica-
tion." Thus, if a physician's informing a third party of a patient's
disease should be fully protected, then the physician should not be
held negligent in inflicting harm on his patient by informing a
third party.
In the case of HIV misdiagnosis, the physician's duty to pre-
vent emotional harm to her patient (which might lead a physician
to avoid reporting positive ELISA tests) conflicts with her duty to
protect society from contagious disease (which would influence the
physician to disclose positive ELISA test results as soon as pos-
sible). The balancing is complicated by the slight uncertainty of
the ELISA test's results. And because of the social stigma sur-
rounding HIV, misdiagnosed patients are particularly sensitive to
disclosure of HIV-positive status.90 Thus, courts have the difficult
task of weighing the "physician's role in promoting public health"
and controlling the spread of disease9' against the concern for
avoiding the creation of genuine emotional distress in individual
patients.
87. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-44 (Cal. 1976).
88. Id. at 342-43 (holding that departure from this "fundamental principle" is only
justified after weighing such factors as: foreseeability and certainty of the harm's occur-
ring, causal connection, moral blame, policy of preventing future harm, and the conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty on the physician).
89. In Moning v. Alfono, the court, in discussing whether to hold a producer of
slingshots liable for an injury caused by one of its products, explained:
The reasonableness of the risk of harm ... turns on how the utility of the
defendant's conduct is viewed in relation to the magnitude of the risk. If a
court is of the opinion that marketing slingshots directly to children is of such
utility that it should be fully protected, the court in effect determines as a
matter of law that the risk of harm so created is not unreasonable and, there-
fore, such conduct is not negligent.
254 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Mich. 1977).
90. See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 71, at nn.132-35 and accompanying text. Studies
have indicated that males who have disclosed their HIV status show significantly higher
suicide rates than other males in their age group. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Risk and
Rationality: The Centers for Disease Control and the Regulation of HP/-infected Health
Care Workers 36 ST. LOUIS L.. 213, 294-95 (1991) (citing Marzuk et al., Increased Risk
of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 JAMA 1333 (1988)).
91. Rodwin, supra note 83, at 252.
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Traditionally,, courts have favored the physician's right to
disclosure over the patient's right to privacy, even in cases involv-
ing stigmatic diseases. Several cases stress that the physician has a
positive duty to protect third parties from a patient's communica-
ble disease. For example, in DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester
County, Inc., a patient's sexual partner contracted hepatitis from
the patient, and then brought an action against the patient's physi-
cian.9' The court held that if the third person plaintiff was in the
class of persons whose health was likely to be threatened by a
patient with a communicable disease, and if erroneous advice is
given to that patient by the physician to the ultimate detriment of
the third person, the third person has a cause of action against the
physician.93 The court determined that the physician was negligent
not to have warned the patient to discontinue sexual relations.94
Many courts, as in DiMarco, hold that a physician has a duty to
protect public health, and that a physician should presume the
existence of a third party in the case of communicable diseases.9"
They note that a physician should take an active role in prevent-
ing the spread of such diseases.96
Failure to warn third parties has been extended to cases in-
volving misdiagnoses.' 7 In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospi-
92. 583 A.2d 422, 423 (Pa. 1990).
93. Id. at 423.
94. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
One who undertakes ... to render services to another which he should recog-
nize as necessary for the protection of a third person . . . is subject to liability
to the third person for [the] physical harm resulting . . . [if] his failure to exer-
cise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or . . . harm is suffered
because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324(A) (1977).
95. See, eg., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); see also infra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
96. But see Lemon v. Stewart, 682 A.2d 1177 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (holding
that when a patient is diagnosed as positive for HIV or AIDS, the physician has no duty
to inform members of the patient's family, and that third parties do not have a cause of
action against the physician for failing to do so); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding, in an AIDSphobia case, that the
county's duty was to protect the confidentiality of arrestee's HIV status, not to impart
such knowledge to arrestee's surgeon).
97. See Robert J. Liebovich, Comment, 24 MEMPHS ST. U. L. REV. 377, 377-79
(1994) (describing a case in which a physician was held negligent for his failure to warn
a family about the contagious nature of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever). Some courts
have tried to limit this liability, insisting that the physician must be aware of the specific
risks to specific persons before a duty to warn exists. See, eg., Gammill v. U.S., 727 F.2d
950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a physician has a duty to exercise reasonable care
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tals,9" a California court held a physician liable to a third party
suffering emotional distress, stating that where a defendant physi-
cian should have foreseen emotional harm to the third party, she
will be held liable.99 In Kaiser, the defendant physician misdiag-
nosed a woman as having infectious syphilis. When the patient's
husband sued for emotional distress, the court allowed damages:
"[i]t is easily predictable," the court reasoned, "that an erroneous
diagnosis of syphilis and its probable source would produce marital
discord and resultant emotional distress to a married patient's
spouse; ... under these circumstances[,] defendants owed plaintiff
a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing the physical condition of
his wife."'1°
Holding a physician liable to third parties for misdiagnosing
patients may have dangerous consequences, especially in cases
involving new technology. The professional service is not per-
formed for the third party, the physician may not even know of
the existence of the third party, and there is neither privity nor a
specific undertaking in favor of the third party. As a result of
exposure to such unpredictable liability, a physician may be less
willing to use new technology.10'
Despite the social stigma of AIDS, courts have held that an
HIV-positive test is no more exempt from disclosure than any
other disease that threatens the well-being of third parties. In one
AIDSphobia case, a hospital failed to warn a police officer that
the patient whom he was asked to subdue suffered from
AIDS."° The officer was bitten by the AIDS patient and
brought an action against the hospital for emotional distress. The
court held that the officer could recover because the public policy
concerning confidentiality of patients' records did not limit the
hospital's duty to warn the officer."°
to prevent spread of infectious disease only to patient's family).
98. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
99. See id at 817.
100. Id. The court also rejected the physical injury requirement:
In our view[,] the attempted distinction between physical and psychological
injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether
the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn on
this artificial and often arbitrary classification scheme.., in the light of con-
temporary knowledge we conclude that emotional injury may be fully as severe
and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress.
Id. at 814, 821.
101. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
102. See Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (W.Va. 1991).
103. See id. at 895 (citing a West Virginia act specifically referring to AIDS testing,
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By recognizing this duty to prevent physical as well as mental
harm to third parties, courts create a situation in which physicians
must be constantly aware of the effects of their actions on parties
beyond the privity of the physician-patient relationship."° Given
that physician liability to third parties is generally recognized,"5
physicians who believe that their patients are HIV-positive may
feel it necessary to inform third parties as well as their patient, in
order to prevent the spread of AIDS. Allowing recovery to third
parties is overly burdensome to physicians. Its assignment of liabil-
ity may contribute to rising medical insurance costs and also to
physicians' decisions to cease practice due to liability concerns. 6
In the absence of the check provided by the physical injury re-
quirement, even minute numbers of misdiagnoses leading to large
jury verdicts for the patient or a third party seriously threaten
physicians and may seriously hinder the availability of innovative
care.
In the wake of HIV misdiagnosis cases in which plaintiffs
have received large damage awards," 7 physicians are unfairly
faced with the decision of whether to divulge HIV test results to
third parties and prevent the spread of disease, or to withhold
such knowledge as long as possible from both the patient and
third parties to prevent the possibility of being sued for a misdiag-
nosis. The dangerous consequences of forcing physicians to choose
the AIDS Related Medical Testing and Records Confidentiality Act, W. VA. CODE
§ 16-3C-3(a)(4) (1988)). The court based its decision on the emotional distress of the
plaintiff, without requiring an accompanying physical injury. The court held that the
wound from the bite, sleeplessness, and loss of appetite were sufficient. Id. at 896.
Along with Johnson, consider the cases in which the physician is diagnosed as
HIV-positive. At least one commentator argues that a physician's HIV-positive status
"should not, in and of itself, provide a patient with a cause of action against the [physi-
cian]." Dorothea Beane, AIDS Crisis and the Health Care Community: Public Concerns
Triggering Questionable Private Rights of Action for Emotional Harms and Legislative
Response, 45 MERCER L. REv. 633, 636 (1994).
104. See, eg., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 213 (Alaska 1995) (holding that
physician's false positive diagnosis of plaintiff could provide basis for loss of parental
consortium claim on behalf of plaintiff's children when false diagnosis, based on screening
test, purportedly led to divorce).
105. See id. at 202-03.
106. See Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost
Containment Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1298
(1994).
107. See, e.g., Machesney v. Bruni, 905 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (D.D.C. 1995) (reducing
four million dollar jury award to two million in case of false positive diagnosis and sub-
sequent treatment).
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between disclosure and caution are aptly illustrated in the recov-
ered memory therapy cases.
C. Examples of the Consequences of Expanded Physician Liability
1. Recovered Memory Therapy. The well-publicized recovered
memory therapy cases demonstrate the consequences of broad
physician liability to third parties in a situation that, like -HV
misdiagnosis cases, involves uncertain medical knowledge.
Recovered memory therapy cases have typically involved an adult
daughter, who, through the help of a psychologist, "recovers"
repressed memories of childhood abuse by her father.' The
technique involves the use of leading questions and other aggres-
sive memory-enhancing procedures to help patients remember
events that were so traumatic that their minds had repressed
them."° Some therapists who specialize in treating victims of
incest and rape rely heavily on recovered memory techniques."0
Cases involving misdiagnoses of sexual abuse are typically
weighted in favor of encouraging the physician to disclose to an
authority any possibility of abuse of her patient."' This tradition-
al protection for the physician was upheld in a recent case, Bird v.
W. C. W. 2 In Bird, a father, cleared of charges of child abuse,
brought a negligence action against the psychologist who had mis-
diagnosed his child. The court held that the psychologist owed no
duty not to misdiagnose the child, noting that psychology is an
"inexact science."" Unlike Molien, where the California court
108. See Victor Dricks, False 'Memories' of Sexual Abuse Rip Families Apart:
'Syndrome' Sparks Heated Debate, PHOENIX GAzErrE, Mar. 25, 1993, at Al, AS.
109. See, e.g., Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Recovered Memories of Alleged
Sexual Abuse" Lawsuits Against Parents, 10 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE & LAW 483, 490
(1992) (noting that childhood sexual abuse victims are more prone than the general pub-
lic to suicidal thoughts, alcohol and drug abuse, anorexia, and bulimia).
110. See, e.g., Miriam Horn, Memories Lost and Found, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 52, 54 (stating that it is generally agreed that victims of childhood
sexual abuse can repress recollections of what happened to them, and that those memo-
ries can be loosened years later, and that highly regarded psychologists and psychiatrists
consider recovered memory therapy a significant benefit for victims who have repressed
memories of incest).
111. For a case discussing physician liability, see Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 41
(Tex. App. 1994) (holding that mental health care professional owed no professional duty
to father not to negligently misdiagnose the condition of his child and finding that in
Texas, there is no longer a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
112. 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
113. Id. at 769.
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extended physician liability to third parties suffering emotional
distress, the Bird court determined that foreseeability of harm to
the parents could not be a basis for recovery." 4 Other courts
have taken Bird one step further, holding that a psychologist has
an affirmative duty to disclose certain information to third par-
ties."5 The cases turn, as do the HIV misdiagnosis cases, on
whether the court decides that the utility of disclosure outweighs,
for policy reasons, the chance of a misdiagnosis negatively affect-
ing one of the parties involved.
Recovered memory therapy adds a new twist to cases dealing
with a therapist's duty to report child abuse, making them even
more akin to the HIV misdiagnosis cases. The twist arises from
the medical uncertainty surrounding recovered memory thera-
py."6 Some experts contend that recovered memory therapy has
only a "pseudoscientific" foundation,"7 and that no empirical sci-
entific evidence supports the theory that a person can lose a mem-
ory for many years and then accurately recover it."' At least
one social psychologist believes that recovered memory therapy
"will come to be recognized as the quackery of the 20th centu-
ry. ,,9 On the other hand, recovered memory therapy is support-
114. See Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769; cf. Hite v. Brown 654 N.E.2d 452, 458-59 (Ohio
App. 1995) (holding that psychologist who failed to report child abuse is not liable be-
cause psychologist's duty to report does not extend beyond psychologist-patient rela-
tionship).
115. See, ag., Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
116. The recent popularization of the incest survivors movement, see Elizabeth P.
Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 523 (1993), has
had a detrimental impact on expert opinions of recovered memory therapy. See eg., EL-
LEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL (1988). This controversial best-sell-
ing book has been referred to as the "bible" of the incest survivors movement, and has
contributed to the recent surge in the popularity of recovered memory therapy. The book
has been criticized for its repeated suggestions that "abuse probably happened, even if
one has no memories of it," the book's statements that "demands for corroboration of
abuse are not reasonable," and the book's encouragement of "'revenge, anger, fantasies
of murder or castration, and deathbed confrontations."' Christina Bannon, Comment,
Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should the Courts Get Involved When
Mental Health Professionals Disagree? 26 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 835, 838 (1994) (citations omit-
ted). In response to the lawsuits brought by adult children, parents who claim to have
been wrongfully accused have established a "False Memory Syndrome Foundation." See
Stephanie Salter & Carol Ness, Critics Denounce False-Memory Group, S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 27, 1993, at Al.
117. See John Hochman, Pseudo-Therapists Cultivate 'Recovered Memory' Accusations,
S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 16, 1993, at A23.
118. See Bannon, supra note 116, at 845.
119. Id. at 846 (quoting Richard Ofshe, social psychologist at the University of Cali-
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ed by respected experts in psychology." Thus, the issue becomes
whether a therapist's use of recovered memory therapy should
trigger the traditional Bird protection against liability for third
party emotional distress.
Over this battlefield of contradictory approaches, cases have
been brought by all the parties involved: by daughters against their
fathers, by daughters who retract charges of sexual abuse and
bring suits against their therapists for implantation of false memo-
ries of abuse, by fathers against therapists for emotional distress
arising out of the charge of child abuse."' The most common
claims asserted in cases against therapists are the breach of a duty
of due care, negligence and medical malpractice." Typically, in
order for the parent (or the adult child) to demonstrate a ther-
apist's malpractice, the parent must show that the therapist failed
to exercise the degree of care, skill and learning expected of a
reasonable health care provider in the same profession and acting
under similar circumstances.'2
In a recent well-publicized case, Gary Ramona, who had been
accused of molesting his daughter, contended that a psychothera-
pist had manipulated his adult daughter into remembering child-
hood incidents of incest that he said never occurred. 4 The jury
awarded $500,000 to Ramona to compensate for his emotional dis-
tress, thus publicizing the belief that recovered memory therapy is
fornia, Berkeley).
120. See, e.g., Horn, supra note 110, at 54-55 (quoting Yale University Professor Mi-
chael Davis explaining that traumatic events "produce unusually strong nerve connections
that serve as long-lasting memories" which can be triggered years later by the right stim-
ulus).
121. See Loftus, supra note 116, at 522 (discussing a case in which a large sum was
awarded to the adult victim).
122. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Laurelwood Hosp., 620 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) (alleging that failure to admit suicidal decedent as psychiatric patient constituted a
breach of the duty of due care and medical malpractice); Smith v. Pust, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
364, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (claiming negligence by therapist who had sexual encounter
with patient while counseling her about childhood sexual abuse); Montoya v. Bebensee,
761 P.2d 285, 286 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (alleging that the therapist was negligent in
accusing father of sexually abusing his child); Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 370 N.W.2d
803, 804 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (alleging that the county was negligent in releasing dece-
dent when it knew he was suicidal).
123. See Bannon, supra note 116, at 851-52 (citing as an example of this requirement
the Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-563(A)).
124. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Jury Awards Father Accused of Incest In Memory
Therapy, N.Y. TIMEs, May 14, 1994, at Al. Ramona tried to prove that his daughter's
therapists had planted memories of abuse using the influence of a hypnotic drug. See id.
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a hoax."2 This example of broad therapist liability to a non-pa-
tient third party suggests the possible chilling effect of allowing a
court (in this case a jury) to decide an issue involving controversial
medical technology.
One commentator has noted that "until mental health profes-
sionals reach an agreement regarding the validity and reliability of
memory recovery techniques, courts have no choice but to allow
juries to decide the validity of memory recovery therapy as a
question of fact in each case," an approach which leads to "in-
consistent jury verdicts and uncertainty regarding a therapist's
potential liability."" To the extent that recovered memory ther-
apy is a valid and useful medical tool, verdicts against therapists
indicate that juries are more swayed by individual pleas than by
overarching public policy considerations. If recovered memory
therapy is viewed as damaging the parent-child relationship, cases
like Ramona "would lead to more suits like it,"' brought by
parents and other non-patients who are affected by therapists'
treatment. Given that recovered memory therapy is supported by
at least some experts, it seems undesirable to give the tools to
eradicate it to an uninformed court or jury.
A physician's unchecked liability to patients and non-patient
third parties raises the question of the consequences of such lia-
bility. In areas such as recovered memory therapy or HIV testing,
a physician's liability is in danger of being equated with the un-
certainties of developing, imperfect medical technology. This sec-
ond danger of doing away with the physical injury requirement is
illustrated by the "Pap smear" cancer misdiagnoses.
2. Pap Smear Testing. Recent lawsuits involving the "Pap
smear" test-used to diagnose cervical cancer in women-clearly
demonstrate that the prospect of liability for misdiagnoses
threatens not only physicians but medical technology itselfY
Millions of women take the Pap smear test every year, and despite
the fact that the test is "one of the greatest success stories in the
history of medicine in terms of cancer prevention,"'29 thousands
125. See id.
126. Bannon, supra note 116, at 855.
127. Mark Hansen, More False Memory Suits Likely, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 36, 37.
128. See, eg., Gangemi v. National Health Labs., 677 A.2d 1163 (NJ. Super. 1996);
Allenius v. Thomas, 538 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio 1989).
129. Katherine M. Bayliss & Debra Van Eyck, At This Rate, Pap Smear May Be
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of women are misdiagnosed.' 30 These misreadings have led to
cervical cancer going undetected and, in some cases, patient
deaths. In a recent case, a Milwaukee medical lab was charged
with reckless homicide in the deaths of two women whose Pap
smears were allegedly misread.' The general counsel of the
American Medical Association criticized the bringing of this
criminal case: "There have to be penalties, and there are penalties,
for physicians and others who make mistakes. There are some
severe ones, but to move into the criminal system is just going to
make physicians even more defensive and less aggressive, and we
don't want a doctor who's afraid to see patients."' Others hope
that the case will not deter women from having regular checkups
and Pap smears, because "while there are cases of human error in
the medical field, and while the tests are not one hundred percent
reliable, they are the best [available], and.., have greatly
reduced the number of women who have died of cervical
cancer."
133
There has been mounting concern regarding the fate of the
Pap smear test in the face of the increasing numbers of cases like
the one in Milwaukee. Experts worry that given the publicity of
these misdiagnoses, the public has been misinformed, resulting in
an "unfortunate disservice to society."1"4 The suits brought indi-
cate a common assumption that when a woman suffers from cervi-
cal cancer following a negative Pap smear test, malpractice must
have occurred, even though (as in the case of the ELISA test)
misdiagnoses may be due entirely to the "inherent limitations" of
Nearing Extinction: Litigation and Misinformation Threaten Availability of This Important
Screening Technique for Women, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTIEL, Apr. 18, 1995, at A7.
Cervical cancer deaths have declined 65% in the past thirty years. Id.
130. Unlike the HIV misdiagnoses, the mistake in the Pap smear cases arises from
false negatives rather than false positives. In this way, the Pap smear misdiagnoses would
generally lead to serious physical harm, rather than the emotional harm involved in an
HIV false positive case. Indeed, most cases are brought as suits for wrongful death. See
Edmonds v. Cytology Servs. of Md. Inc., 681 A.2d 546 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996);
Gangemi, 677 A.2d 1163; Allenius, 538 N.E.2d 93.
131. This case involves charges against tests that were made before the federal gov-
ernment enacted new standards in the early 1990s, limiting the number of slides techni-
cians could read in a given period of time. See Morning Edition" Misreading of Pap
Smears Results in Homicide Charges, (National Public Radio, broadcast Apr. 13, 1995),
available in 1995 WL 2958048.
132. Id
133. Id.
134. Bayliss & Van Eyck, supra note 129, at A7.
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the Pap smear test itself. Fear among cytotechnologists and pathol-
ogists regarding the increased number of lawsuits will most likely
decrease the availability of the Pap smear and increase costs of
the test.135 One expert has asked, when considering the big pic-
ture, "does successful prosecution of [these cases] at this point in
time benefit society in any way? Can this possibly outweigh the
continued damage done to what was a readily available, inexpen-
sive and life-saving screening technique?,
13 6
Though there are indications that Pap smear technology is
improving,137 the fear engendered in the medical profession as a
result of the suits brought against them demonstrates the power
that courts possess over the fate of uncertain medical technology.
Courts should carefully consider whether the interests of an indi-
vidual patient, whose misdiagnosis was due to the inherent imper-
fections of a medical test, outweigh society's interest in making
such tests available.
D. Moving Beyond the Physical Injury Rule: Chizmar v. Mackie
The court in Heiner v. Moretuzzo described "serious emotion-
al distress" as an "emotional injury which is both severe and debil-
itating."'38 Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where
a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be "unable to
cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the cir-
cumstances of the case."' 39 In Chizmar v. Mackie' the Su-
preme Court of Alaska also utilized this "reasonable person" ap-
proach.
In Chizmar, the plaintiff brought a claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress against her physician both for negligently
misdiagnosing her as HIV-positive and for negligently misreporting
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. An advisory committee of the Food and Drug Administration has recommended
government approval of two computer-based systems for use in double-checking Pap
smears. Dr. G. Frederick Kessler, director of labs for Aurora Health Care, said: "'This
system protects us against potential litigation, it provides the cytotechnologist with added
confidence that they have screened everything on the slide .... .' Ronald Rosenburg,
Backing Up a Test for Cancer Cambridge Firm Finds a Way to Cut Misreading of the
Cervical Pap Smear, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1995, at A69 (quoting Dr. Kessler).
138. 652 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ohio 1995).
139. Id. (quoting Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 759 (Ohio 1983)).
140. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
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the results to her husband. The court, ignoring the physical injury
rule, held that a physician has a duty to refrain from inflicting
emotional distress on her patient.14' In addition, the court held
that a physician is privileged to disclose reports to the patient's
spouse and that the physician could not be held liable for the
patient's emotional distress caused by this reporting." Thus,
Chizmar, while moving beyond the physical injury requirement,
raises two issues: first, whether, in a case involving new medical
techniques, it is safe to leave a physician's liability up to a jury;
and second, whether, in the absence of the physical injury require-
ment, a physician's duty to a third party may lead to unchecked
liability.
The court held that the defendant physician owed his patient
a duty to refrain from activity that presented a foreseeable and
unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress,43 and remanded
the issue of negligent misdiagnosis for presentation to the jury.'"
The Chizmar court believed that the "reasonable" people in the
jury would be an adequate check on limitless liability. 4
The court also held that when a physician has diagnosed a
patient with a fatal, sexually transmitted disease, he is privileged to
disclose the diagnosis (whether correct or not) to the patient's
spouse.'" Thus, the patient's claim for emotional distress arising
from the physician's breach of duty of confidentiality was fore-
closed as a matter of law. The court did not recognize the incon-
sistency of, on the one hand, fully protecting the physician's disclo-
sure of the diagnosis to the plaintiff's spouse, and on the other,
subjecting his disclosure to the plaintiff to full liability.
In addressing Chizmar, the court also responded specifically to
the appellate court's decision to apply the physical injury require-
ment. Wisely throwing out the lower court's reliance on that re-
quirement, 47 the court overcompensated by allowing the
plaintiffs claims to be remanded to the jury without any limit
placed on the liability of the defendant physician. Thus, the
Chizmar court broke free from the physical injury precedent, but
141. See id. at 203.
142. See id. at 208.
143. See id. at 203.
144. See id. at 205.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 208.
147. See id. at 200-03.
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failed to replace the physical injury requirement with some mean-
ingful limitation on physician liability.
III. PROTECING PHYSICIANS WITH A
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT RULE
It is clear that the physical impact requirement is no longer a
legitimate means of limiting plaintiff recovery where HIV misdi-
agnoses are concerned. As an attorney for the misdiagnosed pa-
tient in Jones v. Department of Health & Rehabilitation Serv-
ices"4 pointed out: "The legal system does not keep pace with
society .... Up until 1986 or so, AIDS didn't exist. Are we going
to do an injustice to a few people to guard against the problem of
fraudulent claims down the road?"'49 The court in Jones relied
on the finding in R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc. that the excep-
tion to the physical impact rule would have a "substantial impact
on many aspects of medical care, including the cost of providing
that care to the public."'50 Were it to create such an exception,
the R.J. court continued, it would, of necessity, also be allowing a
claim for emotional distress for "any misdiagnosis made from
negligent medical testing."'' The R.J. court concluded that it
would be exceedingly difficult to limit speculative claims for dam-
ages in litigation.' Given the effect that negative media might
have on uncertain medical techniques such as Pap smear tests, and
given the awkward position of a juror in weighing a visible and
emotionally suffering individual against the less immediate societal
interest in preventing spread of a disease or in preventing child
abuse (as in recovered memory therapy), courts need to protect
the physician administering HIV tests against the arbitrary results
of an unlimited tort system.
To protect recovered memory therapy, the Pap smear test,
and the ELISA test, courts must protect the physicians who pro-
vide such treatment. When specific medical techniques are imper-
fect or standards are unclear, courts should, instead of following
the lead of the recovered memory cases, apply a good faith immu-
148. 661 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
149. Mike Oliver, Top Court's 'Impact Rule' Bars Relief For Mental Anguish of HIV
Misdiagnosis, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 5, 1995, at A10.
150. 652 So. 2d 360, 363-64 (Fla. 1995).
151. Id.
152. See id.
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nity standard in order to determine whether the defendant has
breached a duty. Liability should arise only in where the treating
physician does not act in good faith or fails to exercise profession-
al judgment. This standard would recognize that some modem
medical technology is "very difficult to administer."'" Along
these lines, courts have held that a mental health provider who
uses proper therapeutic procedures may not be found negligent,
even if the ultimate diagnosis is incorrect. "
There have been a number of legislative responses to the
physician's duty to third parties in HIV cases. For example, the
California Health and Safety Code provides: "No physician has a
duty to notify any person of the fact that a patient is reasonably
believed to be infected by the probable causative agent of ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome."'5 5 The Code also provides
that no physician shall be held liable for "disclosing to a person
reasonably believed to be the [patient's] spouse ... that the pa-
tient has tested positive on a test to detect infection by the proba-
ble causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome. 15 6
Statutes have also been passed spelling out the procedures for
health care professionals to follow when reporting diseases to a
government health authority. 7 Both of these types of statutes
protect a physician from third party liability, thus preventing the
type of liability that, in the recovered memory cases, threatens
therapists and the psychological profession's ability to determine
the validity of recovered memory therapy.
Courts adjudicating HIV misdiagnosis cases should follow the
lead set by this legislation. Given that the ELISA test, like the
153. Id. at 899.
154. See Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 370 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
155. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25(c) (West 1990).
156. Id. § 199.25(a).
157. See Rodwin, supra note 83, at 252 (commenting that the law regarding the
physician's duty with respect to reporting AIDS and protecting public health is unre-
solved, "but the AMA and the American Psychiatric Association state that physicians are
ethically obligated to divulge a patient's confidences and warn sexual partners known to
be at risk of contagion"); see also AMERCAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS § 9, at 369 n.175 (1957) (stating that confidentiality must give way
where "necessary to protect the welfare of the individual or [of] the community"); Cana-
dian Doctors Authorize Sexual Partner Notification, 2 AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 17,
at 4 (Sept. 9, 1987) (reporting that the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) voted to
allow physicians to violate patient confidentiality and to tell the sexual partners of AIDS
patients that they are at risk).
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Pap smear test, is not 100% certain, 8 and given the importance
of encouraging physicians to share HIV test results with their pa-
tients, a physician's disclosure of test results should be privileged
by a good faith immunity standard. This would place the burden
on the plaintiff to demonstrate either bad faith or gross negligence
on the part of the physician, ultimately preventing the fear of
litigation from affecting a physician's willingness to perform
ELISA tests.
Good faith immunity was not available to private individuals
under common law, 59 but it has been used recently by both leg-
islatures and courts. 16 It has been called a "workable balance of
[individual] and societal interests without compromising to any real
degree the safety and welfare of [the patient]."'' Thus, it would
protect the physician while allowing recovery by a patient who has
been treated with reckless disregard or purposeful negligence.
CONCLUSION
It is dangerous to equate uncertain medical technology with
physician negligence. The legal system must prevent limitless physi-
cian liability and allow space for medical testing to develop and
improve. Thus, like the recovered memory cases and the Pap
smear cases, the HIV misdiagnosis cases should be approached
with a more careful concern for the issues underlying physician
liability. In order to better protect physicians and the technology
on which they rely, a good faith immunity standard should be
applied in cases where HIV has been misdiagnosed.
158. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
159. See Cristine Kuhn, Note, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Can the Supreme Court
Rescue the Inimical Qualified Immunity Doctrine?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 681, 697-98 (1995)
(noting the distinction between qualified immunity, based on an objective standard, and
the good faith defense, requiring the court to consider subjective factors).
160. For the most recent example of the use of good faith immunity standard, see the
"right to die" cases. In these cases, physicians who follow the dictates of a living will are
protected as long as they act (or refrain from acting) in good faith. See, e.g., John F.
Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) (holding that phy-
sicians need only act in good faith to avoid liability with respect to a right to die case);
see generally Mark Strasser, Incompetents and the Right to Die: In Search of Consistent
Meaningful Standards, 83 KY. L.J. 733, 799 (1995) (stating that "[p]hysicians who treat or
fail to treat should be immune from liability as long as their decisions to act or refrain
from acting are made in good faith").
161. Eric P. Gifford, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Social Worker Immunity: A Cause of Ac-
tion Denied, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1013, 1038 (1995).
1996]

